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I. INTRODUCTION 
The date is January 17, 2008. Two hunters, searching for coyotes, 
stumble across a frozen, shirtless, and lifeless body on a little-used dirt 
road near Lawton, Iowa, about ten miles east of Sioux City.1 It’s the 
body of Zachary Cooper.2 
Two days earlier, Samuel Wright, Jeremy Williams, Nick Perez, 
Ray Dukes, and three others gathered in Perez’s Sioux City apartment.3 
The group decided to purchase some marijuana, and Perez volunteered to 
contact Zachary Cooper, his source for the drug.4 Cooper was nervous 
about dealing to these individuals, but he agreed to meet Perez and Wil-
liams to discuss the transaction.5 Cooper explained that he “wanted to 
make sure things go straight,” and “[i]f things boil down wrong . . . he 
would have to do something to [Williams] and his family”; Williams re-
plied, “[d]ude, don’t threaten my . . . family.”6 
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 1. Nick Hydrek, Investigators Search for Motive in Cooper’s Slaying, SIOUX CITY J. (Jan. 28, 
2008), http://www.siouxcityjournal.com/news/investigators-search-for-motive-in-cooper-s-slaying/ 
art icle_3cb52f0f-fb40-56e2-82e0-cdc9174cc571.html. 
 2. State v. Wright, No. 08-1737, 2010 WL 200052, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2010). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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Cooper arrived at Perez’s apartment around 6:30 or 7:00 p.m., but 
he never returned home.7 As Cooper entered the apartment, Williams 
produced a handgun and started punching Cooper in the face.8 Wright 
and Williams led Cooper into a car, and they coaxed both Dukes and Pe-
rez to join them.9 They drove the car into rural Woodbury County, where 
Wright and Williams forced Cooper to kneel down in front of the car and 
put his hands on the hood.10 Wright11 manually loaded a .380 caliber 
handgun and shot Cooper before passing the gun to Williams, who re-
loaded the weapon, stood over Cooper’s body, and shot him a second 
time.12 
On the way back to Sioux City, Williams stopped for gas at a Kum 
& Go.13 Surveillance footage captured Williams and Perez inside the 
store, but the four individuals standing next to Williams’s car could not 
be readily identified.14 At trial, Perez and Dukes identified Wright as one 
of the individuals in the surveillance images.15 Wright took the stand in 
his own defense, claiming that although he did stop by Perez’s apartment 
on the evening of January 15, 2008, he left by foot prior to Cooper’s ar-
rival and never saw Cooper that evening.16 
Without additional evidence, the jury’s determination with respect 
to Wright’s participation in the crime would amount to a credibility as-
sessment—would the jurors believe Perez and Dukes, or would they be-
lieve Wright? These credibility assessments are often grounded in a ju-
ror’s individual valuation of a witness’s demeanor.17 And jury determina-
                                                        
 7. Id. at *2. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. The trial testimony conflicted on who fired the first shot. Perez testified Wright shot 
Cooper first and Williams second, while Dukes testified Williams shot first and Wright second. See 
id. at *2–3. The jury convicted Wright of first-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and first-degree 
kidnapping, and a separate jury convicted Williams of lesser assault and kidnapping charges. Molly 
Montag, Jury Finds Man Guilty of Murder, SIOUX CITY J. (Aug. 25, 2008), http://www.sioux 
cityjournal.com/news/jury-finds-man-guilty-of-murder/article_3552f6e9-bf61-515b-9d34-
e3517c09b3fe.html. 
 12. Wright, 2010 WL 200052, at *2. Apparently, Cooper did not die immediately, and he was 
able to walk three quarters of a mile before collapsing face down in the snow, where the hunters 
located him two days later. Id. at *3. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at *5. 
 17. See, e.g., Olin G. Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1078 (1991) (“The 
appearance and nonverbal behavior of a witness might bear upon the witness’s credibility in two 
ways: first, as an indicator of sincerity—the willingness of the witness to tell the truth—and, second, 
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tions of witness credibility, though critical to the jury’s ability to weigh 
evidence and find facts, can be flawed by inherent biases.18 But in Wright, 
the jury had more information from which to draw conclusions about 
Wright’s whereabouts on the evening in question. Namely, Wright’s cell 
phone received an unanswered text message at 7:07 p.m. on January 15, 
2008, and his cell phone records indicated that the communication 
transmitted through the east sector of a cell tower in Lawton, Iowa.19 
Wright received a second text message at 7:16 p.m. that transmitted 
through the west sector of the same tower.20 While these records only 
revealed the location of Wright’s phone, and not necessarily Wright him-
self,21 they substantially undermined Wright’s testimony that he stayed in 
Sioux City after leaving Perez’s apartment in order to help a friend 
move.22 The jury convicted Wright of murder, robbery, and kidnapping 
in the first degree.23 
As cell site location information becomes more common in crimi-
nal investigations such as the one in Wright, advocates and judges face 
emerging questions about the information’s admissibility and potential 
evidentiary objections. This Comment provides a blueprint to admit cell 
site location information in Washington state courts that balances the 
public interest in promoting truth and accountability with the criminal 
defendant’s interest in a fair and impartial trial. Specifically, this Com-
ment concludes that cell site location information is admissible, provided 
that the State lays an adequate foundation for both the underlying data 
collection—via expert testimony—and the secondary mapping technolo-
gy. Programs that illustrate data contained in call records should also be 
independently verified to establish their accuracy. 
For the purposes of this Comment, cell site location information is 
information maintained by a cellular provider that is used to determine 
the physical location from which a cell phone sent a communication or at 
                                                                                                                            
as evidence of the quality of the witness’s perceptions and memory—his or her capacity to know the 
truth.”). 
 18. E.g., Bennett L. Gershman, How Juries Get It Wrong—Anatomy of the Detroit Terror Case, 
44 WASHBURN L.J. 327, 327–28 (2005) (noting that “a jury’s determination of the facts may be 
influenced by sympathy, passion, and prejudice” and “a witness’s credibility may be distorted by the 
jury’s subjective assessment of the witness’s background, narrative, language, and demeanor”). 
 19. Wright, 2010 WL 200052, at *4. 
 20. Id. 
 21. In an effort to explain why his cell phone was in Lawton during this time, Wright testified 
that he “inadvertently left that phone behind” and later recovered it from Williams’s car later in the 
evening. Id. at *5. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Montag, supra note 11. 
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which it received a signal.24 Part II provides an overview of how cellular 
providers collect location information using either triangulation or satel-
lite positioning technology and an overview of how trial advocates can 
map the information to demonstrate the approximate location of the per-
son’s phone. 
This Comment principally explores when and how a party can suc-
cessfully admit cell cite location information into evidence. Beginning 
with the threshold inquiry of relevance, Part III examines when cell site 
location information is relevant and in what circumstances the infor-
mation, though relevant, could be unfairly prejudicial, cumulative, or 
confusing. Part IV provides the bulk of the analysis, which centers on the 
substantive foundation necessary to establish the information’s credibil-
ity and authenticity. Part V looks at three ancillary issues: hearsay, a 
criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights, and the in-
troduction of a summary of voluminous records. Finally, Part VI offers a 
summary of and conclusion to this Comment’s analysis. 
The legal showing necessary to obtain cell phone records is beyond 
the scope of this Comment.25 The analysis evaluates the evidentiary ob-
                                                        
 24. Cell site location information is also sometimes referred to as “historical cellular tower 
data.” E.g., In re Application for a Court Order Authorizing AT&T to Provide Historical Cell Tower 
Records, Misc. No. ST-11-WS-08, ST-11-WS-09, ST-11-WS-10, ST-11-WS-12, 2011 WL 7092589, 
at *2 (V.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 2011). 
 25. The Supreme Court recently held the attachment of a GPS tracking device to a suspect’s 
vehicle constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Jones, 
132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). Thus, the Government must obtain a warrant in order to track a person of 
interest in real time by attaching a locating device to his or her property. Id. (“The Government 
physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt 
that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”). This holding does not address whether a warrant is 
required to obtain a person’s call records after a crime has occurred, however. At least one federal 
judge has expressly held that “[w]hen the government requests records from cellular services, data 
disclosing the location of the telephone at the time of particular calls may be acquired only by a 
warrant issued on probable cause,” and “the date, time, called number, and location of the telephone 
when the call was made” are “constitutionally protected from . . . intrusion.” Order on Objections, In 
re Applications of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, Misc. No. H-11-223 (S.D. Tex. 
Nov. 11, 2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/hughesorder1116.pdf. 
For further discussion about the privacy interests implicated by the Government’s use of cell tower 
location tracking technology, see Laurie Thomas Lee, Can Police Track Your Wireless Calls? Call 
Location Information and Privacy Law, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 381, 383 (2003) (exploring 
the extent to which call location information is protected by constitutional and statutory provisions, 
and articulating “legislative solutions for clarifying and bolstering call location privacy rights”); see 
also Note, Who Knows Where You’ve Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular 
Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307 (2004) [hereinafter Who Knows Where 
You’ve Been?]; Briana Schwandt, Is the Government in My Pocket? An Overview of Government 
Location Tracking of Cell Phones Under the Federal System and in Montana, 72 MONT. L. REV. 261, 
286 (2011) (arguing cell phone location tracking technology “implicates an informational privacy 
interest” under the Montana State Constitution). 
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stacles to admitting cell site location information after the records have 
been lawfully acquired. While this Comment focuses on cell site location 
information within the context of criminal proceedings, the information 
could also be used in civil cases. The physical location of a party to a 
civil dispute would be relevant, for example, when the doctrine of frolic 
and detour could relieve an employer’s liability for the actions of its em-
ployee,26 or to provide evidence that the driver of an automobile violated 
a safety statute in a negligence action.27 
II. BACKGROUND 
Wireless communication is firmly entrenched in the daily lives of a 
large and growing number of Americans. In fact, CTIA-The Wireless 
Association (CTIA), an international association representing the wire-
less industry, reports that the number of active, data-capable wireless 
devices in the United States reached 278.3 million in 2010.28 This num-
ber represents roughly 89% of the U.S. population.29 The wireless indus-
try also saw a 16% increase in the use of SMS messages, more common-
ly known as text messages, between 2010 and 2011.30 
The federal government responded to this increase in wireless 
communication by requiring cellular providers to provide cell site loca-
tion information to emergency first responders.31 In the 1990s, 911 oper-
ators became increasingly “alarmed they could not determine the loca-
tion of distressed cell phone callers.”32 For example, a Florida woman 
was able to dial 911 from her cell phone after her car skidded off the 
turnpike and into a canal, but rescue emergency personnel could not de-
termine her precise location, and by the time they found her, she had 
died.33 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has since im-
                                                        
 26. While civil parties do not share the vast subpoena powers of the state government, a civil 
party could serve a cellular provider with a subpoena duces tecum in order to produce cell site loca-
tion information outside the control of the opposing party. 
 27. For a discussion of the criminalization of driving while using a cellular phone, see Douglas 
R. Richmond, Drunk in the Serbonian Bog: Intoxicated Drivers’ Deaths as Insurance Accidents, 32 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 83 (2008). 
 28. Press Release, CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n, CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n Semi-Annual Survey 
Reveals Historical Wireless Trend (Oct. 11, 2011), available at http://www.ctia.org/media/ 
press/body.cfm/prid/2133. 
 29. The U.S. Census Bureau reported 311,591,917 people living in the United States in the 
year 2010. USA QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/ 
00000.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2012). 
 30. CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n, supra note 28. 
 31 . Wireless 911 Services, FED. COMM. COMM’N (May 26, 2011), http://www.fcc.gov/ 
guides/wireless-911-services. 
 32. Schwandt, supra note 25, at 264. 
 33. Lee, supra note 25, at 381. 
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plemented rules requiring wireless service providers to transmit infor-
mation about a phone’s location to public safety answering points in or-
der to improve emergency response times.34 Section A of this Part pro-
vides an overview of how cellular providers are able to discern a particu-
lar cell phone’s location when it sends or receives a communication. Sec-
tion B describes the modern call detail record, an automatically generat-
ed record of location data that advocates can use to illustrate a cell 
phone’s location. 
A. Determining a Cell Phone’s Location 
Cellular providers obtain locating information primarily in two 
ways: (1) by using Global Positioning System (GPS) technology; or (2) 
by triangulating the phone’s location using either the time difference of 
arrival or angle of arrival techniques.35 
1. Global Positioning System 
The United States Air Force maintains at least twenty-four opera-
tional GPS satellites orbiting Earth at any given time.36 These satellites 
transmit one-way signals to constantly update their position and time in 
space.37 On the ground, devices equipped with GPS technology receive 
the signals from the satellites and calculate, based on each satellite’s dis-
tance to the receiver, the device’s position on the globe.38 The accuracy 
of the GPS device’s location varies depending on the type of receiver, 
but GPS is generally estimated to determine the device’s location within 
ten to twenty meters.39 
GPS data is available only to cell phones “enabled with GPS tech-
nology,”40 meaning the cell phone contains a GPS receiver that com-
                                                        
 34. See Wireless 911 Services, supra note 31. 
 35. Schwandt, supra note 25, at 264. 
 36. How Does GPS Work?, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L AIR & SPACE MUSEUM, http://www.nasm.si. 
edu/exhibitions/gps/work.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2011). 
 37. The Global Positioning System, GPS.GOV, http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/ (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2012). 
 38. Id. 
 39. How Does GPS Work?, supra note 36. The FCC’s regulations seek to establish “accuracy 
and reliability standards of 100 meters for 67 percent of calls and 300 meters for 95 percent of calls 
for network-based (non-GPS) technologies, and 50 meters for 67 percent of calls and 150 meters for 
95 percent of calls for handset-based (GPS) technologies.” In re Application of United States for an 
Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 
532–33 (D. Md. 2011) (citing 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h) (2011)). 
 40. Schwandt, supra note 25, at 264. 
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municates with the positioning satellites.41 When the cell phone receives 
signals from at least four satellites, the receiver calculates the phone’s 
location.42 This is the technology that enables real time navigation and 
turn-by-turn directions.43 
2. Time Difference of Arrival and Angle of Arrival Methods 
Even without GPS technology, cellular providers can still estimate 
a phone’s location by using mathematical triangulation.44 “Cellular tele-
phone networks are divided into geographic coverage areas known as 
‘cells,’ which range in diameter from many miles in suburban or rural 
areas to several hundred feet in urban areas.”45 When a cell phone is 
switched “on,” it periodically transmits a signal to all tower antennae 
within the phone’s range.46 The time distance of arrival method essential-
ly tracks a phone’s longitude and latitude when a communication is sent 
or received, and a triangulation algorithm produces an estimate of the 
phone’s location by measuring the time it takes for different cell towers’ 
signals to reach the phone.47 Like the time distance of arrival method, the 
angle of arrival method relies on transmissions between the phone and a 
tower, but the algorithm uses the angles of the signals, rather than a 
measurement of time, to approximate the phone’s location.48 The calcula-
tion’s accuracy depends to some degree on the number of cell towers 
within the phone’s range.49 For example, the triangulation methods are 
generally less accurate in rural areas with fewer cell towers.50 
                                                        
 41. Cell phones equipped with GPS technology are increasingly common. According to one 
2012 survey, half of the wireless customers in the United States are now using so-called smartphones, 
which universally utilize GPS technology for navigation and other applications. See Davindra 
Hardawar, The Magic Moment: Smartphones Now Half of All U.S. Mobiles, VENTUREBEAT.COM 
(Mar. 29, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2012/03/29/the-magic-moment-smartphones-now-
half-of-all-u-s-mobiles/. 
 42. Schwandt, supra note 25, at 264. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See, e.g., Schwandt, supra note 25, at 264–65; Who Knows Where You’ve Been?, supra 
note 25, at 308–10. 
 45. In re Application of the United States for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. 
on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter Application for 
Cell Site Location Info.]. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Schwandt, supra note 25, at 265; Lockwood, supra note 25, at 308–09. 
 48. Schwandt, supra note 25, at 265; see also Application for Cell Site Location Info., 460 F. 
Supp. 2d at 451 (“[I]n some instances, depending upon the characteristics of the particular network 
and its equipment and software, it is possible to determine not only the tower receiving a signal from 
a particular phone at any given moment, but also in which of the three 120-degree arcs of the 360-
degree circle surrounding the tower the particular phone is located.”). 
 49. See Schwandt, supra note 25, at 265. 
 50. Id. 
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B. The Call Detail Record 
Law enforcement agencies rely on the cellular provider’s call detail 
record to determine a cell phone’s location during a specific time. The 
data in the record is often classified as prospective or historical.51 “A 
prospective order is sought when law enforcement officials wish to ob-
tain [cell site location information] ‘as it happens in real time,’” whereas 
historical data “allows the government to learn about a suspect’s past and 
often relatively recent whereabouts.”52 When a cell phone sends or re-
ceives a communication, the cellular provider automatically records a 
data set corresponding to each call or text message for billing purposes.53 
Most standard call detail records show the time of the call, the duration 
of the call, the tower from which the call was sent or received, and the 
specific “face” of the tower from which the call was sent or received.54 
This face represents one of three separate directional vectors that look 
like “120 degree slices of a full 360 degree pie.”55 
Once a party has obtained the call detail record for the relevant 
dates and times, the information can be synthesized to map the vectors 
approximating the phone’s location when it sent or received a communi-
cation, producing a visual graphic for the courtroom. 56  For example, 
some law enforcement offices use a program called Advanced Cell 
Tracking Systems to simplify this process.57 A division of Air Systems, 
LLC, Advanced Cell Tracking Systems provides a subscription-based 
service to law enforcement agencies.58 The program uses data from the 
call detail record to map the approximate location of the phone during 
each communication on a Google Earth overlay.59 Unlike the call detail 
record, which is generated automatically, this process requires an officer 
to manually input the data points into the program.60 Figure 1 is an ex-
                                                        
 51. Patrick T. Chamberlain, Court Ordered Disclosure of Historical Cell Site Location Infor-
mation: The Argument for a Probable Cause Standard, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1745, 1747–49 
(2009). 
 52. Id. at 1748. 
 53. Laurie Thomas Lee, Location-Based Communication Systems: A Look at Intelligent Net-
working and Privacy Concerns, GLOBAL MEDIA J., Oct. 1, 2011, at 2. 
 54. State v. Wright, No. 08-1737, 2010 WL 200052, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2010). 
 55. Id. 
 56. E.g., id. 
 57. See ADVANCED CELL TRACKING SYSTEMS, http://www.advancedcelltrackingsystems.com/ 
cms/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2011). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action more probable or less probable than it would be with-
out the evidence.”65 In other words, cell site location information is ad-
missible if it makes a consequential fact more or less probable as long as 
other statutory and rule provisions do not limit the evidence’s admissibil-
ity. 
Washington courts, like most jurisdictions, have established a low 
bar to satisfy the relevance requirement: “[T]he threshold to admit rele-
vant evidence is low and even minimally relevant evidence is admissi-
ble.” 66  Under this permissive standard, cell site location information 
should be relevant whenever it makes a person’s whereabouts more or 
less probable, and the person’s whereabouts is of consequence to the de-
termination of the litigation. In nearly every circumstance, a party can 
advance a coherent argument that cell site location information tends to 
make a person’s whereabouts more or less probable because the location 
of the person’s cell phone, while not wholly dispositive, tends to indicate 
the location of the person himself. 
Because cell site location information affects the probability of a 
person’s whereabouts, the relevance inquiry really hinges on whether 
that person’s whereabouts is of consequence to the ultimate outcome of 
the case. This is true when the person’s location is a material fact that is 
in dispute.67 The rule also limits the scope of call records and their corre-
sponding demonstratives, which can be introduced against an opposing 
party.68 For instance, courts should refuse to admit cell site location in-
formation corresponding to calls that do not assist the trier of fact in any 
meaningful way—such as calls made or received during a time period 
unrelated to events in the case. In summary, cell site location information 
will generally be relevant when a person’s location is material to the out-
come of the litigation. This standard preserves a trial judge’s discretion 
                                                        
 65. WASH. R. EVID. 401. 
 66. E.g., Kappelman v. Lutz, 217 P.3d 286, 290 (Wash. 2009) (citing State v. Gregory, 147 
P.3d 1201, 1241 (Wash. 2006)). 
 67. This includes third parties whose whereabouts may, in some circumstances, be material to 
the outcome of the litigation; for example, if a defendant testifies to having spent the day of the 
crime with a friend, and the friend is unable to testify, the friend’s cell phone records might be rele-
vant to determine the location of the defendant. Note that “privacy rights are personal rights that 
cannot be vicariously asserted,” State v. Francisco, 26 P.3d 1008, 1010 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001), and a 
defendant seeking to suppress a third party’s records would have the burden to prove the government 
intrusion violated his own privacy rights, see State v. Cardenas, 47 P.3d 127, 129–30 (Wash. 2002). 
 68. Not all of a person’s records will be relevant to the litigation, and irrelevant records will be 
excluded. WASH. R. EVID. 402. 
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while maintaining a liberal relevance threshold that is consistent with 
Washington case law.69 
B. Limits on Relevant Cell Site Location Information 
Even if cell site location information is relevant in a particular case, 
a court’s analysis does not end here. The next question is whether the 
relevant evidence should be excluded or limited by another constitutional, 
statutory, or rule provision.70 The primary limit on relevant evidence is 
articulated in Washington Rule of Evidence 403: “Relevant evidence 
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence.”71 
Determining whether relevant evidence is unfairly prejudicial is far 
from a scientific endeavor. Washington courts have looked to the identi-
cal federal rule’s72 advisory committee notes to help define unfairly prej-
udicial evidence.73 The notes indicate that inciting emotion in the jury 
often causes unfair prejudice.74 Some commentators have suggested that 
courts rely too heavily on emotion to detect unfair prejudice, and the 
analysis should focus on the “end product of the prejudice, not just on the 
process by which the prejudice might be created”—namely, fact finding 
and fairness.75 Irrespective of potential drawbacks to a court’s “gut-check” 
balancing test, Washington courts continue to characterize unfairly prej-
udicial evidence as evidence that is “more likely to arouse an emotional 
response than a rational decision by the jury.”76 Relevant evidence is pre-
sumed admissible under this rule,77 and the burden of showing unfair 
prejudice is on the party seeking to exclude the evidence.78 
                                                        
 69. See Kappelman, 217 P.3d at 290. 
 70. See WASH. R. EVID. 402. 
 71. WASH. R. EVID. 403. 
 72. The language of the federal rule is equivalent to the Washington rule. Compare FED. R. 
EVID. 403, with WASH. R. EVID. 403. 
 73. City of Auburn v. Hedlund, 201 P.3d 315, 319 (Wash. 2009). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly 
Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 498, 503 (1983) (noting most courts have “failed to 
develop a coherent definition of unfair prejudice,” reducing judges to an “‘I know it when I see it’” 
approach that relies too heavily on emotion). 
 76. E.g., Hedlund, 201 P.3d at 319 (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Cronin, 14 P.3d 
752, 760 (Wash. 2000) (quoting State v. Gould, 791 P.2d 569, 573 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990)). 
 77. State v. Burkins, 973 P.2d 15, 25 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, 989 P.2d 1142 
(Wash. 1999). 
 78. Hayes v. Wieber Enterprises, Inc., 20 P.3d 496, 500 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
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In the context of cell site location information, the evidence is 
probably most probative when the guilt or innocence of the accused is 
dependent upon a showing that the accused was physically present to 
commit the crime. In Wright, for example, the State argued that Wright 
shot Cooper, placing him in Lawton sometime between 6:30 and 7:30 
p.m., while Wright argued he remained in Sioux City during this time.79 
In these situations, cell site location information is highly probative evi-
dence for the jury to decide which testimony is more credible, and the 
value of the cell tower data outweighs any prejudice suffered by the de-
fendant. 
Cell site location information should be subject to greater scrutiny 
when the State introduces the information to prove an ancillary fact, such 
as a pattern of movement,80 rather than to place the accused at the scene 
of the crime. The State, for example, might seek to establish a defend-
ant’s intent to distribute narcotics by using cell site location information 
to show a consistent and prolonged pattern of movement between the 
defendant’s home and a suspected drug manufacturing or distribution 
center. The evidence is fairly probative because the State has a valid in-
terest to prove the defendant’s intent, but the defendant should not be 
unfairly prejudiced by his own zip code. The defendant might simply 
reside in an area fraught with narcotics dealing, for example. The intro-
duction of cell site location information in this instance requires greater 
judicial scrutiny because this information could trigger an emotional re-
action in the jury that presupposes the defendant’s guilt.81 
Relevant cell site location information should be excluded as un-
fairly prejudicial when the defendant’s location is not substantially con-
sequential to the outcome of the case, and the location could incite unfa-
vorable emotions in the jury.82 For example, if the State seeks to intro-
duce evidence that the defendant made or received calls from an adult 
entertainment establishment, gambling house, or seedy neighborhood 
before or after committing an unrelated crime, the cell site location in-
formation’s prejudicial effect would likely outweigh its probative value. 
In addition to limiting unfairly prejudicial relevant evidence, the 
rule also gives the trial judge discretion to exclude otherwise relevant 
evidence that is confusing, misleading, or cumulative, that wastes time, 
                                                        
 79. State v. Wright, No. 08-1737, 2010 WL 200052, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2010). 
 80. See WASH. R. EVID. 406 (“Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an 
organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant 
to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity 
with the habit or routine practice.”). 
 81. See Gershman, supra note 18, at 327. 
 82. WASH. R. EVID. 403. 
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or that would cause undue delay.83 Cell site location information is cu-
mulative and a waste of time if the State has adequately proved, through 
other testimony, that the defendant was in a certain location during a cer-
tain time, or if the defendant admits to being in a location that is con-
sistent with the call record data. Practitioners should seek to admit the 
underlying call records before any demonstrative maps plotting a cell 
phone’s location.84 Therefore if the map is excluded from evidence, it 
could at least be offered for illustrative purposes only,85 whereas call 
records have no illustrative value. 
IV. FOUNDATIONAL QUESTIONS: ESTABLISHING ACCURACY AND 
RELIABILITY 
Once a court is satisfied that the cell site location information is rel-
evant and will not unduly prejudice the opposing party, the court must 
determine whether there is an adequate foundation to admit the infor-
mation into evidence. While some jurisdictions have blurred the founda-
tional testimony for the collection of cell site location information with 
the process of mapping the data,86 Washington courts should be more 
precise.87 A trial court should require the party seeking to admit cell site 
location information to lay two distinct foundations: (1) the accuracy and 
reliability of the underlying GPS or triangulation methodology, and (2) 
the accuracy and reliability of the program used to map the data for 
demonstrative purposes. Section A of this Part explores whether expert 
testimony is required to provide either or both of these foundations. Sec-
tion B then examines a party’s burden to establish that the technology is 
reliable and properly authenticated. 
A. Expert Testimony 
Jurisdictions differ on whether expert testimony is necessary to ad-
mit cell site location information.88 In United States v. Sanchez, a Mi-
                                                        
 83. Id. 
 84. See 5D KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES: COURTROOM HANDBOOK ON 
WASHINGTON EVIDENCE ER 901 (2011–2012 ed.). 
 85. See, e.g., Feldmiller v. Olson, 450 P.2d 816, 818 (Wash. 1969) (noting illustrative material 
is subject to less onerous scrutiny than material offered into evidence). 
 86. See, e.g., Perez v. State, 980 So. 2d 1126, 1131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008), review denied, 
994 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1618 (2009); Wilson v. State, 195 S.W.3d 193, 
200–02 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006). 
 87. A more precise foundational probe promotes consistency among trial courts and minimizes 
the opportunity for reversible error. 
 88. Compare United States v. Sanchez, 586 F.3d 918, 929 (11th Cir. 2009) (no expert required), 
with Wilder v. State, 991 A.2d 172, 200 (Md. Ct. App. 2010) (expert required). 
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ami–Dade detective testified that he reviewed the call records of two de-
fendants charged with conspiracy to possess a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute.89 Without qualifying as an expert, the detective ex-
plained how the location information had been gathered in general terms, 
which the court held was sufficient to admit the call records into evi-
dence and illustrate the phone’s location during the calls for the jury.90 
Maryland, on the other hand, expressly rejected this approach: 
“[W]e believe that the better approach is to require the prosecution to 
offer expert testimony to explain the functions of cell phone towers, de-
rivative tracking, and the techniques of locating and[] or plotting the ori-
gins of cell phone calls using cell phone records.”91 In Wilder v. State, 
the court reasoned Maryland’s evidence rules prohibited “the admission 
of ‘lay opinion’ testimony based upon specialized knowledge, skill, ex-
perience, training, or education,” and the defendant’s argument that “[a]n 
expert from the cell phone company or an engineer familiar with cell 
phone technology [is] the proper person to testify” ultimately prevailed.92 
Washington courts should adopt Maryland’s standard and require a 
qualified expert to provide foundation testimony for the underlying cell 
data collection method. Under Washington’s Rules of Evidence, a lay 
witness’s testimony is similarly limited to opinions and inferences that 
do not rely on technical or other specialized knowledge.93 “Expert testi-
mony is required when an essential element in the case is best established 
by an opinion that is beyond the expertise of a layperson.”94 In the con-
text of cell site location information, one can anticipate that GPS and 
mathematical triangulation are topics beyond the expertise of most lay 
jurors. Accordingly, the State should proffer qualified expert testimony 
to explain the cell tower location methodologies and the information em-
bedded in the call detail record. 
With respect to the secondary mapping technology, however, the 
need for an expert is less clear. Most jurors are probably familiar with, or 
at least recognize, modern mapping software that is widely available 
online. On the other hand, some level of training and technical expertise 
is required to run the software that creates visual representations of a cell 
phone’s movement. While courts should ensure that the person laying the 
                                                        
 89. Sanchez, 586 F.3d at 929. 
 90. Id. The State did not seek to admit the illustrations into evidence. Id. 
 91. Wilder, 991 A.2d at 198. 
 92. Id. at 196 (citing the appellant’s brief) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 93. See WASH. R. EVID. 701. 
 94. Seybold v. Neu, 19 P.3d 1068, 1074 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Harris v. Robert C. 
Groth, M.D., Inc., 663 P.2d 113 (Wash. 1983)) (holding that expert testimony is required to establish 
the standard of care and most aspects of causation in a medical negligence action). 
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foundation to introduce the reproductions has adequate training in the 
software, expert testimony should not be required for this purpose. Given 
the prevalence of this kind of technology in everyday life, the essential 
elements of the secondary mapping function are not better established 
“by an opinion that is beyond the expertise of a layperson.”95 
If Washington courts require expert testimony to lay the foundation 
for the collection and storage of cell site location information, the parties 
should be afforded some guidance as to who is qualified to give this tes-
timony. There are two general approaches. The State could seek to quali-
fy as an expert a law enforcement officer with training in the subject area, 
or the State could seek to qualify as an expert one of the cellular provid-
er’s employees.96  Within this second category, a separate question is 
raised with respect to whether a cellular provider’s records custodian is 
able to provide an adequate foundation for both the data collection meth-
odology and the contents of the records themselves, or if a radio frequen-
cy engineer is the more appropriate person to lay this foundation.97 
1. Law Enforcement Officer 
A witness, qualified as an expert, may testify in the form of an 
opinion “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue.”98 When considering the admissibility of evidence under Washing-
ton Rule of Evidence 702, courts accordingly consider whether the wit-
ness qualifies as an expert and whether the witness’s testimony would be 
helpful to the trier of fact.99 
Washington courts have held that a witness may qualify as an ex-
pert based on knowledge, skill, training, or education.100 The requisite 
knowledge is not limited to formal training, however, and practical expe-
rience may suffice.101 In State v. McPherson, a Washington trial court 
allowed a city detective to testify in detail about the process of manufac-
turing methamphetamine. 102  The defendant contested the detective’s 
qualifications as an expert because, although the detective attended a for-
ty-hour DEA course on the “assessment, analysis, and cleanup of meth-
                                                        
 95. Id. 
 96. The party seeking to admit the cell site location information is free to call any qualified 
expert to introduce the data collection method; these two options are simply the most practical. 
 97. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 98. WASH. R. EVID. 702. 
 99. State v. Guilliot, 22 P.3d 1266, 1271 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
 100. E.g., State v. McPherson, 46 P.3d 284, 292 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 288. 
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amphetamine labs,”103 he did not hold a formal degree in chemistry.104 
The court of appeals concluded that the detective properly qualified as an 
expert because he completed the DEA course, attended several confer-
ences, and had extensive experience investigating methamphetamine 
labs—factors that collectively satisfied the special knowledge require-
ment.105 
As cell site location information becomes more common in crimi-
nal prosecutions, select law enforcement personnel will likely receive 
training on inputting information from a call detail record into the appli-
cable software in order to produce a visual graphic of a particular cell 
phone’s location during specific times.106 While the State might advance 
a McPherson-type argument—that the officer’s training and experience 
qualifies the officer as an expert—to allow the officer to provide the req-
uisite foundation for cell site location information in its entirety, the of-
ficer’s expertise is really limited to the secondary mapping technology.107 
For this reason, most law enforcement personnel probably lack the 
knowledge and experience necessary to “explain the functions of cell 
phone towers, derivative tracking, and the techniques of locating and[] 
plotting the origins of cell phone calls using cell phone records.”108 One 
of the cellular provider’s employees (or a third person with relevant ex-
pertise), therefore, is better suited to provide this foundational testimony, 
and most jurisdictions that have addressed the issue follow this ap-
proach.109 
2. Records Custodian vs. Radio Frequency Engineer 
Some jurisdictions permit a cellular provider’s custodian of records 
to lay foundation for both the contents of the call detail record and the 
underlying data collection methodology.110 Other jurisdictions have in-
stead required testimony from one of the cellular provider’s radio fre-
                                                        
 103. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 104. Id. at 292–93. 
 105. Id. at 293. 
 106. For example, Deputies in King County, Washington, have begun using Advanced Cell 
Tracking Systems.  
 107. Id. 
 108. Wilder v. State, 991 A.2d 172, 198 (Md. Ct. App. 2010). 
 109. See Perez v. State, 980 So. 2d 1126, 1131–32 (Fla. Ct. App. 2008); Pullin v. State, 534 
S.E.2d 69, 71 (Ga. 2000); State v. Wright, No. 08-1737, 2010 WL 200052 (Iowa App. Jan. 22, 
2010); State v. Manzella, 128 S.W.3d 602, 608–09 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); Wilson v. State, 195 
S.W.3d 193, 200–02 (Tex. App. 2006). 
 110. See Wilson, 195 S.W.3d at 200–02 (allowing a Sprint custodian of records to lay the ap-
propriate foundation for the business records exception to the hearsay rule and to provide an expert 
opinion explaining how the tower data indicates the phone’s location). 
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quency engineers.111 Washington courts should allow records custodians 
to perform both functions. 
A records custodian is an employee responsible for keeping call de-
tail records in the ordinary course of business,112 whereas radio frequen-
cy engineers typically have more extensive background in wireless engi-
neering.113 A radio frequency engineer is “a professional who designs 
radio frequency components, circuits and devices,” and often manages 
the production of radio frequency devices.114 While records custodians 
have less technical engineering expertise than radio frequency engineers, 
a records custodian is an appropriate employee to introduce cell site loca-
tion information as a qualified expert. In Wilson v. State, for example, the 
defendant contested a Texas trial court’s admission of testimony from a 
Sprint records custodian, who explained the information contained in the 
call records and offered an expert opinion with respect to the interpreta-
tion of those records.115 The court of appeals, rejecting the defendant’s 
assertion, reasoned that the custodian’s “skill, experience, training and 
knowledge” would adequately assist the trier of fact to understand a core 
issue in the case.116 The Wilder court in Maryland followed this line of 
reasoning as well: “In the case before us, [the record custodian’s] testi-
mony implicated much more than mere telephone bills. He elaborated on 
the information provided by the cell phone records . . . .”117 In Iowa, on 
the other hand, prosecutors subpoenaed the “radio frequency engineering 
manager” to explain Wright’s call records and identify the location of his 
phone during the murder.118 
While radio frequency engineers can probably be expected to better 
understand the inner workings of cell phone towers and the process of 
determining a phone’s location using either GPS or triangulation, Wash-
                                                        
 111. See Wright, 2010 WL 200052, at *4, *6. 
 112. See Records Custodian Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM, http://definitions.uslegal. 
com/r/records-custodian/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2012). 
 113. Lucy Friend, RF Engineer Job Description, EHOW MONEY, http://www.ehow.com/facts_ 
6718798_rf-engineer-job-description.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2011). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Wilson, 195 S.W.3d at 200–02 (rejecting the defendant’s claim that the records custodian 
was not qualified to opine on cell site location information). 
 116. Id. at 202 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 117. Wilder v. State, 991 A.2d 172, 199 (Md. Ct. App. 2010). The custodian’s ability to plot 
the cell phone’s location using the information in the call detail record “clearly required some spe-
cialized knowledge of skill . . . that is not in the possession of the jurors.” Id. at 200 (citing Ragland 
v. State, 870 A.2d 609, 725 (Md. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 118. State v. Wright, No. 08-1737, 2010 WL 200052, at *4 (Iowa App. Jan. 22, 2010) (holding 
the radio frequency engineering manager was able to provide the necessary foundation for cell tower 
technology and method of storing data in call detail records even though he himself did not maintain 
the records). 
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ington courts should permit a records custodian to provide this infor-
mation as a qualified expert. This approach comports with Washington’s 
expert testimony jurisprudence, reduces the burden on cellular providers, 
and streamlines the trial process. First, a party’s expert witness “does not 
have to be a rocket scientist,”119 and a records custodian should qualify, 
provided he or she can demonstrate a general and sufficient knowledge 
of the way in which the data in a call detail record are gathered.120 Se-
cond, radio frequency engineers have substantial training and expertise, 
and they are integral to wireless infrastructure.121 For these reasons, sub-
poenaing a cellular provider’s radio frequency engineer places a more 
substantial burden on the wireless provider because it has to supplement 
the managerial and technical functions of the engineer while he or she 
appears in court. Furthermore, because radio frequency engineers are less 
numerous than records custodians, scheduling the engineer for testimony 
runs a higher risk of delay, wasting valuable time and further congesting 
the state trial courts. 
In summary, Washington courts should require expert testimony to 
lay the foundation for cell site location information, but law enforcement 
officers or other witnesses need not qualify as experts to introduce any 
secondary mapping technology used to illustrate the call records. One of 
the cellular provider’s employees, rather than a law enforcement agent, is 
best suited to provide foundation for the underlying testimony, but courts 
should not insist that the employee be a radio frequency engineer. The 
cellular provider’s records custodian should suffice to provide this foun-
dation. Finally, the expert’s testimony should be limited to explaining the 
data collection methodology, the accuracy of the tracking procedures, 
and offering an opinion on the interpretation of the data. It is well settled 
that experts may not offer an opinion with respect to the innocence or 
guilt of the defendant.122 
B. Establishing Reliability 
When a records custodian or other qualified expert takes the stand 
to explain the call detail record and underlying locating methodology, he 
or she will also need to establish the reliability of cell site location in-
                                                        
 119. State v. McPherson, 46 P.3d 284, 292 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 120. Id. at 293 (holding the “lack of a complete and formal college education in the field” did 
not disqualify the expert). 
 121 . See Heather Head, What Is an RF Engineer?, HARRIS COMM. (Nov. 16, 2009), 
http://harriscommunications.net/expert-advice/what-is-an-rf-engineer/. 
 122. See, e.g., State v. Black, 745 P.2d 12, 19 (Wash. 1987); State v. Garrison, 427 P.2d 1012, 
1015 (Wash. 1967); McPherson, 46 P.3d at 293. 
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formation. In other words, the State must lay a proper foundation that the 
call records accurately reflect the cell phone’s location. This Section ex-
plores whether the expert’s testimony should be subject to a Frye hearing 
and how the expert must authenticate both the call detail records and any 
secondary mapping technology. 
1. Is Frye Implicated? 
Frye v. United States first announced that the proponent of scien-
tific evidence must demonstrate that the theory or method relied upon is 
generally accepted within the scientific community. 123  While the Su-
preme Court has since held Federal Rule of Evidence 702 supersedes 
Frye in federal courts,124 Washington courts continue to use the standard 
enunciated in Frye to evaluate new scientific evidence.125  Under this 
standard, both the scientific theory underlying the evidence and the tech-
nique or method used to implement the theory must be generally accept-
ed in the scientific community.126 Evidence that “does not involve new 
methods of proof or rely on new scientific principles,” however, is not 
subject to a Frye hearing.127 When considering whether Frye is implicat-
ed, the court’s role is not to evaluate the merits of a particular theory, but 
rather to determine whether a legitimate dispute exists about the scien-
tific reliability of the evidence.128 
No Washington court has expressly held that GPS or network-based 
location tracking (using angle of arrival or time distance of arrival prin-
ciples) constitutes a novel scientific theory, but the Washington Depart-
ment of Corrections employs GPS technology to monitor sex offend-
                                                        
 123. Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific and 
Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5th 453 (2001); accord Frye v. United States, 293 
F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 597 (1993). 
 124. See Daubert, 509 U.S. 597. 
 125. E.g., State v. Martin, 684 P.2d 651, 654 (Wash. 1984) (affirming Washington’s adherence 
to the Frye standard); State v. Woo, 527 P.2d 271, 272 (Wash. 1974) (adopting the Frye test in 
Washington); State v. Strauss, (In re Det. of Strauss), 20 P.3d 1022, 1025 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) 
(rejecting the Daubert test and again affirming Frye in Washington); see also Hon. Jack Nevin, 
Conviction, Confrontation, and Crawford: Gang Expert Testimony as Testimonial Hearsay, 34 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 857, 887 n.122 (2011) (“Under Frye, an expert’s testimony cannot exceed the 
underlying scientific or technical understanding. It must be accepted in the scientific community. . . . 
In State v. Baity . . . the Washington State Supreme Court reaffirmed that Frye would continue to be 
the Washington standard for acceptance of scientific or technical evidence.”). 
 126. State v. Gregory, 147 P.3d 1201, 1238 (Wash. 2006). 
 127. State v. Roberts, 14 P.3d 713, 740 (Wash. 2000) (citing State v. Baity, 991 P.2d 1151, 
1157 (Wash. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 128. State v. Phillips, 98 P.3d 838, 841–42 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (“Mere disagreement as to 
the conclusions or weight to be given the results [of scientific evidence] . . . does not amount to a 
significant dispute.”). 
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ers,129 and the use of the technology has not generated any litigation dis-
puting its scientific reliability.130 At least one Washington court has ex-
pressly held that radio tracking device technology does not implicate 
Frye, however.131 In State v. Vermillion, the defendant robbed a Seattle 
bank, and the bank teller handed the defendant “a bag containing money, 
a confidential tracking device, and bait money.”132 The court held the 
tracking system did not “involve a novel scientific theory,” and “a Frye 
inquiry is unnecessary” if the evidence “does not involve a novel scien-
tific theory or principle.”133 The tracking system in Vermillion used “the 
transmission and reception of radio signals between the tracking device, 
receiving unit, and transmission towers,” which the court characterized 
as “common technology.”134 The court reasoned the system “only re-
quired objective observation of information relayed from the tracking 
device to the receiving unit,” analogizing to other scientific devices that 
are not subject to Frye—such as police radar and the colposcope.135 
Like the radio tracking tool used in Vermillion, GPS and network-
based locating tools rely on similar principles, which require objective 
observation of information relayed between the cell phone and cell tow-
ers or satellites in order to estimate the device’s physical location.136 The 
technology does not rely on a new or unusual scientific theory—the 
technology relies on math.137 Washington courts have held that mathe-
matical calculations, such as statistical analysis used in DNA profiles and 
actuarial instruments used to predict the future dangerousness levels of 
sex offenders, do not implicate Frye.138 Similarly, because cell site loca-
                                                        
 129. See Andrew Garber & Jennifer Sullivan, State to Electronically Monitor Sex Offenders, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 27, 2007), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2003906581_ 
predators27m.html. 
 130. The weight of authority suggests electronic monitoring systems are reliable and do not 
need to be substantiated by expert testimony. 
 131. State v. Vermillion, 51 P.3d 188, 198 (Wash. 2002). 
 132. Id. at 191. 
 133. Id. at 198 (citing State v. Hayden, 950 P.2d 1024 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998)). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. (relying on City of Bellevue v. Lightfoot, 877 P.2d 247 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (con-
cluding radar evidence does not require a Frye hearing); State v. Noltie, 786 P.2d 332 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1992), aff’d, 809 P.2d 190 (Wash. 1991) (concluding the colposcope, a device used to examine 
the cervix, does not rely on a novel theory and is not subject to Frye)). 
 136. See supra Part II.A. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See State v. Bander, 208 P.3d 1242, 1254–55 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (concluding the trial 
court did not err when it declined to hold a Frye hearing on the reliability of DNA statistical calcula-
tions because a number of scientific articles and other state jurisdictions considered the methods to 
be generally accepted in the scientific community despite some critics and explaining that “Frye 
does not require unanimity”); In re Det. of Taylor, 134 P.3d 254, 259 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (noting 
actuarial tests are generally accepted in the scientific community). 
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tion information does not rely on a novel scientific theory, it should not 
require a Frye hearing. At the very least, the reliability of cell site loca-
tion information is not subject to a legitimate scientific dispute provided 
the expert acknowledges that the records reflect “approximate” locations 
of the phone itself.139 
The next question is whether demonstrative evidence mapping the 
cell phone’s location is based on novel scientific principles and therefore 
subject to a Frye inquiry.140 Washington courts have articulated that a 
Frye hearing is necessary to substantiate the general acceptance of 
“computer-generated simulations used as substantive evidence.”141 The 
party seeking to admit these simulations as substantive evidence must 
show the following: 
(1) the computer is functioning properly; (2) the input and underly-
ing equations are sufficiently complete and accurate (and disclosed 
to the opposing party so that they can be challenged); and (3) the 
program is generally accepted by the appropriate community of sci-
entists for use in the particular situation at hand.142 
The need to subject mapping programs, like Advanced Cell Track-
ing Systems, to a Frye hearing depends on whether the program consti-
tutes a “computer-generated simulation”143  or “nothing more than [a] 
sophisticated record-keeping system.”144 In State v. Sipin, the court held 
“computer-generated simulations used as substantive evidence or as the 
basis for expert testimony regarding matters of substantive proof must 
have been generated from computer programs that are generally accepted 
by the appropriate community of scientists.”145 The State’s expert testi-
fied that a vehicle crash simulation program “would create a predictive 
image of the vehicle movement, based on the laws of physics” by “input-
ting variables from the scene and the vehicle, such as steering, braking, 
and speed.”146 By contrast, another Washington court held Frye was not 
                                                        
 139. See State v. Wright, No. 08-1737, 2010 WL 200052, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2010) 
(“[The radio frequency engineer] acknowledged that the locations on the chart were only ‘approxi-
mate areas’ where the cell phone would have been at the times in question.”). 
 140. See State v. Roberts, 14 P.3d 713, 740 (Wash. 2000) (citing State v. Baity, 991 P.2d 1151, 
1157 (Wash. 2000)). 
 141. See State v. Sipin, 123 P.3d 862, 868 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). 
 142. Id. The court invalidated the program under the third prong of the Frye test because the 
scientific community disagreed about the program’s usefulness. Id. at 871. 
 143. Id. at 864. 
 144. State v. Russell, 882 P.2d 747, 776 (Wash. 1994) (holding expert testimony referring to 
computer programs listing various characteristics of homicides in Washington did not involve novel 
scientific principles). 
 145. Sipin, 123 P.3d at 868–69. 
 146. Id. at 865 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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implicated when computer programs utilized databases to isolate the 
characteristics of Washington and nationwide homicides.147 In that in-
stance, the State used these programs to show the “rarity of posed murder 
victims” using statistical analysis.148 
Basic software that uses coordinates to superimpose vectors upon a 
map does not rely on novel scientific principles. These mapping software 
simply display data that was recorded at the time of the communication; 
they do not predict a course of events like vehicle crash simulators. They 
are also not “used as substantive evidence”149—they are generally used to 
illustrate substantive evidence contained in the call detail record. There-
fore, the technology at issue here is closer to the technology under re-
view in Roberts than in Sipin, and the secondary mapping programs 
should not be subject to Frye. While a defendant might object to the in-
troduction of cell site location information on the ground that it is not 
generally accepted in the scientific community, this objection is some-
what misguided because the technology does not rely on new or unusual 
scientific principles. But defense counsel can and should demand a 
showing that the information going into the computer program—and the 
illustrations coming out of the program—accurately reflect the location 
of the cell phone. This issue is explored in the next subsection. 
2. Authentication and Calibration 
Although a Frye inquiry is probably unnecessary for the introduc-
tion of cell site location information, the party seeking to admit cell site 
location information must establish that the records are authentic.150 By 
way of illustration, Washington Rule of Evidence 901 provides ten ex-
amples of how evidence could be appropriately authenticated.151 First, 
the records custodian could authenticate the call detail records by way of 
his or her oral testimony.152 As Tegland points out, this is a relatively 
straightforward process: “The requirement of authentication or identifi-
                                                        
 147. Russell, 882 P.2d at 776–77. 
 148. Id. at 776. 
 149. Sipin, 123 P.3d at 868. 
 150. See WASH. R. EVID. 901(a) (“The requirement of authentication or identification as a 
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the 
matter in question is what its proponent claims.”). 
 151. WASH. R. EVID. 901(b) (“By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the 
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rule.”). 
 152. See WASH. R. EVID. 901(b)(1) (illustrating that the testimony of a witness with knowledge 
can authenticate evidence). 
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cation is easily satisfied in most situations.”153 All one needs to show is 
that the records offered into evidence are, in fact, the records collected 
and maintained by the cellular provider that correspond to the defend-
ant’s cell phone number. 
Authenticating maps that illustrate the call records, however, is 
somewhat more involved. The key to authenticating maps is to offer 
proof of their accuracy, reliability, fairness, and completeness.154 The 
party offering the evidence must make a prima facie showing that would 
“permit a reasonable juror to find in favor of authenticity or identifica-
tion.”155 Because the records custodian or the law enforcement officer 
presumably did not accompany the defendant while he used his cell 
phone, these witnesses cannot truly “authenticate” the maps’ reliability 
through oral testimony. A more precise approach would be to authenti-
cate the maps by presenting evidence that they were prepared using a 
process or system that consistently produces an accurate result.156 
Cell site location “plotting programs” often utilize existing technol-
ogy, such as Google Earth, that enables users to view satellite images and 
maps of the globe.157 A Pennsylvania court has considered law enforce-
ment’s reliance on Google Earth to indicate the distance between a 
school zone and an alleged drug transaction.158 The court concluded that 
the “use of the Google Earth technology was properly authenticated 
when [the detective] testified about his familiarity with the Google Earth 
system and his independent verification of Google Earth’s accuracy us-
ing two known points.”159 The detective verified Google Earth’s accura-
cy by inputting two known locations and comparing the program’s esti-
mated distance to his own physical measurements.160 “Google Earth’s 
measurement was within one foot” of the distance measured by hand.161 
Washington courts should require a showing that any illustrations 
of a cell phone’s location have been prepared using a process or system 
that produces an accurate result. At least one Washington case reinforces 
                                                        
 153. 5D TEGLAND, supra note 84. 
 154. 44 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 707 (1986). 
 155. State v. Payne, 69 P.3d 889, 893 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003); see also 5C KARL B. TEGLAND, 
WASHINGTON PRACTICE: EVIDENCE LAW & PRACTICE § 901.1 n.3 (5th ed. 2007). 
 156. See WASH. R. EVID. 901(b)(9) (illustrating that a process or system that produces an accu-
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 157. What Is Google Earth?, GOOGLE, http://earth.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?hl=en& 
answer=176145 (last updated Sept. 27, 2011). 
 158. Commonwealth v. Suarez-Irizzary, Nos. CP-38-CR-1204-2009, 1206-2009, 1207-2009, & 
1217-2009, 2010 WL 5312257, at *108, *109 (Pa. D. & C.5th Aug. 6, 2010). 
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 161. Id. at *112. 
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this principle.162 In State v. Bashaw, the court found error in admitting 
testimony about the results of a measuring device without proper authen-
tication.163 The Vermillion court’s conclusion that evidence derived from 
a radio tracking device did not require a Frye hearing also seems to be 
influenced by proper authentication: “The record reflects that police wit-
nesses properly authenticated the system by showing that it was working 
properly at the time police located the device.”164 
In the context of cell site location information, authentication can 
be achieved by demonstrating that the program is calibrated to ensure 
operational accuracy. For example, an officer could make a call from a 
fixed location, input that call’s data into the program, and validate 
whether the location on the map reflects the location of the call. If the 
program is independently verified, the court can be assured that the in-
formation in the illustrations is, in fact, what the State purports it to be. 
V. OTHER EVIDENTIARY CHALLENGES: HEARSAY, CONFRONTATION 
RIGHTS, AND SUMMARY OF VOLUMINOUS RECORDS 
There are a number of objections a party seeking to suppress cell 
site location information might advance beyond the relevance and foun-
dational questions. This Part addresses three noteworthy objections—
hearsay, violation of the defendant’s confrontation rights, and the im-
proper admission of summary evidence. 
A. Hearsay 
A party seeking to suppress cell site location information might ob-
ject on the ground that the call records constitute inadmissible hearsay 
evidence. Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by the Washing-
ton Rules of Evidence, by other court rules, or by statute.165 The first 
question is whether the cell site location information constitutes hearsay 
in the first instance. Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”166 The term “state-
                                                        
 162. State v. Bashaw, 234 P.3d 195, 199–200 (Wash. 2010), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Nunez, 285 P.3d 21 (Wash. 2012) (“[R]esults of a mechanical device are not relevant, and 
therefore are inadmissible, until the party offering the results makes a prima facie showing that the 
device was functioning properly and produced accurate results.”). 
 163. Id. 
 164. State v. Vermillion, 51 P.3d 188, 198 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). 
 165. WASH. R. EVID. 802. 
 166. WASH. R. EVID. 801(c). 
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ment” is further defined as either “an oral or written assertion” or “non-
verbal conduct” if the person intends his conduct to be an assertion.167 
The “statements” at issue in the context of cell site location infor-
mation are the call records themselves. These records would be intro-
duced to prove the truth of the matter asserted, namely, the truth of the 
phone’s location. But the records are subject to the hearsay rule only if 
they constitute “written assertions” within the meaning of the rule. The 
time of the call, the duration of call, and the cell tower activated are 
probably not “assertions” within the meaning of the rule.168 Therefore, 
the call detail records are probably not “statements” and hearsay is not 
implicated in the first instance. 
Even if Washington courts assume the call records do constitute 
hearsay, the records are admissible under the business records exception 
to the hearsay rule.169 This statutory exception provides, 
A record of an act, condition or event, shall in so far as relevant, be 
competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testi-
fies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was 
made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, 
condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of 
information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify 
its admission.170 
If these statutory requirements are met, computerized records are treated 
the same as any other business records and considered admissible hear-
say.171 The data included in a call detail record are records of acts, condi-
tions, or events because they reflect the act of transmitting a cellular 
communication from tower to phone; the time and place of the call and 
the cell tower activated are conditions associated with each transmission. 
The call detail records are automatically generated at the time of the 
                                                        
 167. WASH. R. EVID. 801(a). 
 168. The term “assertion” is not defined by statute, but courts give undefined words “their 
ordinary meaning” and “the court may look to the dictionary for such meaning.” State v. Gonzalez, 
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standard to admit computer-generated evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay 
rule); see also State v. Smith, 558 P.2d 265, 270–71 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (admitting an exhibit 
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 170. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.45.020 (2010). 
 171. State v. Quincy, 95 P.3d 353, 354 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
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communication,172 and they are kept in the regular course of business.173 
Moreover, “[i]t is not necessary that the person who actually made the 
record provide the foundation” for the record, so general testimony from 
the cellular provider’s records custodian about how the records are kept 
in the normal course of business should satisfy the rule.174 
All other jurisdictions that have considered the question of hearsay 
have admitted cell site location information under the business records 
exception.175  For instance, one Nebraska court reasoned that printing 
computer-stored records “for evidentiary purposes” did not “deprive” the 
printouts of their status as business records.176 Because call detail records 
properly fall under the business records exception, Washington courts 
should overrule a challenger’s hearsay objection as long as the State has 
laid a sufficient foundation to show that the records are generated at the 
time of the call and kept for business purposes. 
B. Confrontation Rights 
If a court concludes the call records are not hearsay, then offering 
the records into evidence will not implicate the defendant’s confrontation 
rights.177 But if the court concludes the records are admissible hearsay 
under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, the defendant’s 
confrontation rights warrant further review. The Confrontation Clause of 
the Sixth Amendment provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him.”178 The Clause only bars “testimonial” hearsay evidence, 
                                                        
 172. E.g., State v. Wright, No. 08-1737, 2010 WL 200052, at *7 n.6 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 22, 
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however, when the defendant has not been afforded a prior opportunity 
to cross-examine the absent witness.179 While Washington’s constitution 
does not directly mirror the language of the Sixth Amendment,180 and 
“arguably gives broader protection to the defendant,” 181  Washington 
courts have treated Crawford v. Washington and its progeny as control-
ling precedent.182 The Supreme Court of Washington has since adopted 
the four-factor “primary purpose” test first announced in Davis v. Wash-
ington to determine whether a statement is testimonial.183 Under this test, 
Washington courts evaluate the timing of the statement relative to the 
events discussed, “the threat of harm posed by the situation,” the need for 
information to resolve a present emergency, and the “formality of the 
interrogation.”184 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has expressly held 
that cell site location information is nontestimonial.185 In United States v. 
Green, the State of Georgia subpoenaed a defendant’s call records from 
Metro PCS, and an expert other than a Metro PCS employee testified 
about the documents’ meaning and accuracy.186 The district court admit-
ted the records into evidence, and on appeal the defendant argued that 
this action violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses 
against him.187 The court concluded the cellular provider generated the 
defendant’s call records “for the administration of Metro PCS’s business, 
and not for the purpose of proving a fact at a criminal trial.”188 Therefore, 
                                                        
 179. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); see also Marc McAllister, Evading 
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the records were nontestimonial, and their admission did not offend the 
defendant’s constitutional rights.189 
If Washington courts decide that cell site location information does 
constitute hearsay, and a witness other than the declarant introduces the 
records (in this case the cellular provider), the court should determine 
whether the evidence is testimonial hearsay and therefore barred by the 
Confrontation Clause. Historical call records—those sought after the 
commission of a crime or pattern of movement190—are nontestimonial 
because they are not prepared in anticipation of trial.191 A defendant 
could advance a more credible argument that prospective call records—
those sought in real time192—are testimonial, but the cellular provider 
would record the same information irrespective of any interest from the 
government.193 In Crawford, the Court specifically mentioned that busi-
ness records are “by their nature” nontestimonial.194 Because cell site 
location information gathered from cellular providers in the normal 
course of business is nontestimonial, Washington courts should hold that 
testimony introducing the records by an expert other than the person who 
actually prepared the records does not violate the principles of the Con-
frontation Clause. 
C. Summary Evidence 
Finally, a defendant might object to the admission of maps or ex-
hibits summarizing cell site location information on the ground that only 
the records constitute evidence. In Sanchez, the judge instructed the jury 
that certain maps depicting the location of the defendant’s cell phone 
“were not evidence, and that the evidence consisted of MetroPCS’s data-
base and the call records reflecting information contained in the data-
base.”195 It is unclear whether the Government sought to admit the maps 
into evidence or merely provide an illustration of the evidence.196 
Regardless, Washington’s Rules of Evidence provide that “the con-
tents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which cannot 
be conveniently examined in court may be presented in the form of a 
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chart, summary, or calculation.”197 Moreover, a summary of complicated 
or voluminous records admitted pursuant to Washington Rule of Evi-
dence 1006 “is substantive evidence that does go to the jury room.”198 
For example, one Washington court concluded that a spreadsheet sum-
marizing numerous credit card statements was properly admitted, and the 
trial judge did not err in sending the exhibit into the jury room for delib-
eration.199 Under this reasoning, Washington courts may properly admit 
into evidence summaries of cell site location information, in the form of 
maps or charts, if the records are “voluminous” and cannot be conven-
iently examined. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As cell phones become a way of life for more and more Americans, 
courts can anticipate that law enforcement agencies will bolster their ef-
forts to use cell site location information in criminal prosecutions. This 
information is most commonly used to prove that the defendant’s cell 
phone, and presumably the defendant, was in the vicinity of the crime 
when it occurred. To date, cell site location information has generated 
significant scholarship and attention with respect to privacy protections 
and the legal showing necessary to obtain the information.200 However, 
relatively few courts have addressed the evidentiary standards to offer 
cell site location information into evidence. This Comment attempts to 
provide a working roadmap for judges and practitioners in the State of 
Washington when confronted with questions surrounding the admissibil-
ity of this evidence. 
In summary, cell site location information is relevant when a per-
son’s specific location is material to the outcome of the case and reveal-
ing the person’s whereabouts will not unfairly prejudice the jury. Wash-
ington courts should require separate foundations for the underlying data 
collection methodology and the secondary mapping technology, and a 
qualified expert is necessary to provide the former. The cellular provid-
er’s records custodian should satisfy this requirement. With respect to 
reliability, a Frye inquiry is unnecessary, but law enforcement agents 
who have prepared maps or illustrations of a cell phone’s location must 
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authenticate these demonstratives by independently verifying the soft-
ware’s accuracy. Finally, hearsay, confrontation challenges, and objec-
tions to summary evidence can all be overcome with relative ease. Cell 
site location information will only become more widely used in criminal 
trials, and judges and advocates alike should be well prepared to confront 
these issues when they arise. 
 
